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Abstract
Minimum wages have been a major consideration in Indonesia in recent years, as the
government has strongly pursued a minimum wage policy.  The levels of regional minimum
wages have been increased significantly since 1989, and there is a concern that these increases
may have slowed employment growth.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the
employment effects of minimum wages, using data for 26 provinces, covering the period from
1988 to 1999.  The study focuses on different groups of workers within the urban formal sector.
The results of graphical and statistical analysis indicate some support for the conventional
theory of the negative employment effects of minimum wages.
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia has a large labour force, a high unemployment rate and a rapidly expandinglabour market.  The Indonesian labour market comprises a large proportion of workerswho are sensitive to variations in parameters of a minimum wage regime.  These groups
include females, youth workers and less educated workers.  As an illustration, females and
youth accounted for 38.4 and 21.3 percent of all labour force participants, respectively, in
1999.  Less educated workers accounted for 76.3% of all workers in that year.  With these
unique economic circumstances, the importance of minimum wages has been a major
consideration in the recent years, although minimum wages have been a characteristic of the
Indonesia labour market since the early 1970s.
The main reason for the recent importance of minimum wages has been that the
government has strongly pursued a minimum wage policy.  The levels of minimum wages
were increased very significantly, particularly after 1990.  This raises concerns whether
further large increases in minimum wages will have positive or negative effects on
employment.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of the increases in
minimum wages on various groups of workers in Indonesia.
To provide a framework for this study, theoretical models and the main empirical
studies on the links between minimum wages and employment are presented.  Some
models suggest that increases in the minimum wage that lead to increases in market
wages, and which do not correspond to increases in productivity, should have the
effect of reducing employment, increasing labour supply and increasing unemployment.
Most of the available empirical evidence on the effects of increases in the minimum
wages on employment supports this prediction.  On the other hand, the alternative
models suggest that the link between minimum wages and employment is not
automatically negative, and might even be positive.
This study examines data for 26 provinces, covering the period from 1988 to 1999.  A
focus is on the specific groups of workers within the urban formal sector, such as females,
youth workers, and less educated workers, which have been identified in many previous
studies as the groups most vulnerable to changes in minimum wages.  Graphical analysis
is used to illustrate the possible employment effect in several provinces with the largest
urban formal employment.  Then, using statistical tools, the study explores a number of
alternative models that have been used in the literature for quantifying this employment
effect.
The paper is organised as follows. Chapter Two briefly introduces the theoretical
framework and the main empirical studies on the links between minimum wages and
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employment.  Chapter Three illustrates the labour market situation and the practice with
respect to minimum wages in Indonesia.  Chapter Four investigates the employment effect of
the minimum wage in Indonesia by using graphical analysis and statistical tools.  Chapter
Five summarises this study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.Introduction
This chapter briefly introduces the theoretical framework and the main empirical
studies on the links between minimum wages and employment. It has two main sections.
The first section examines the predictions of a number of the economic models of minimum
wage effects.  The first three models consider a competitive labour market in which the
available supply of labour is homogeneous. The models suggest that increases in the
minimum wage that lead to increases in wages, and which do not correspond to increases in
productivity, should have the effect of reducing employment, increasing labour supply and
increasing unemployment.  This presentation is followed by an outline of alternative models
(monopsony, efficiency-wage) which suggest that the link between minimum wages and
employment is not automatically negative, and might even be positive.
The second section of this chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the impact of
increases in the minimum wage on employment levels.  In some studies, the empirical
evidence has shown that increases in the minimum wage tend to reduce employment rates.
But other studies claim that minimum wage increases do not necessarily lead to less
employment, and may even create more jobs for the unskilled.  The main results of these
studies will be presented in this section.
2.2. The Theoretical Models
2.2.1. Competitive Labour Market Model
The most basic model of the consequences of minimum wage legislation on
employment focuses on a single competitive labour market.  In this model, many firms compete
for workers while a large number of individuals compete for jobs.  Neither a firm nor an
individual can affect the equilibrium wage.  The available supply of labour is assumed
homogeneous.  Figure 1 depicts this idealised market.
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The amounts of labour supplied and demanded (measured on the horizontal axis)
depend on the level of the wage (measured on the vertical axis).  The downward-sloping
curve represents the marginal productivity of labour.  For a given stock of the other factors of
production, the contribution to output of each additional worker is assumed to decrease as
the total number of workers increases.  This curve can be interpreted as a labour demand
schedule.  The upward-sloping curve represents the alternative earnings of the workers and
can be interpreted as a labour supply schedule.
Competitive forces are predicted to operate so that the wage tends towards the
equilibrium value, W0, the wage rate corresponding to the point of intersection of the supply
and demand curves.  The initial employment is E0.  A minimum wage is simply a wage
imposed on the market above the equilibrium wage of W0.  Assume this wage is set at W1.
Following the introduction of the minimum wage of W1, employment falls to E2.  At this
higher wage, more workers will offer themselves for jobs, so labour supply will increase to E1.
Therefore, the effect of the minimum wage is to reduce employment and to create unemployment
of E1-E2.
This analysis shows there are three major effects of a minimum wage: on employment,
on labour supply and on unemployment.  There are also effects on the total earnings of
labour.  All these effects depend on the crucial own-wage elasticities of demand and supply.
These elasticities have been the focus of much of the empirical literature that is reviewed
below.
Figure 1
The Competitive Labour Market
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2.2.2.Two-Sector Model
This model extends the simple model outlined above by considering two sectors of the
economy, one being covered by the minimum wage and one that is not covered by the minimum
wage.  The later sector is termed the uncovered sector.
When the minimum wage is introduced higher than the equilibrium wage in the covered
sector, the workers displaced by the minimum wage move to the uncovered sector.1   This flow
of workers will shift the supply curve in the uncovered sector to the right, thereby placing
downward pressure on wages in this sector.  If we apply the predictions of traditional
economic theory, employment in the uncovered sector would increase.  It is important to note
that unemployment need not result from the minimum wage in this model: rather those who
would otherwise have been unemployed in the covered sector can move to the uncovered
sector, where the wage can adjust to clear the market.
Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) argued that those displaced from the covered sector
do not automatically become employed in the uncovered sector. As wages in the uncovered
sector fall, some of those displaced by the minimum wage, as well as a part of those who were
originally employed in the uncovered sector, may decide not to work in the uncovered sector
because the wage there is less than their reservation wage.  Rather they may continue to
search for employment in the relatively high wage covered sector.  This phenomenon of
queuing or “wait unemployment” is analysed in section 2.2.3.
In developed countries, where the coverage of minimum wage appears high, the single-
sector model might be appropriate. For developing countries, however, the two-sector model
will be more relevant. In these countries only a small share of workers sell their services in a
regulated, “formal” sector, subject to a mandated minimum wage.  The remainder work in an
unregulated, uncovered, “informal” sector, where wages are determined by the market
(Packard, 2001, p.4). In the context of Indonesia, for example, the covered and uncovered
sectors would refer to a distinction on the basis of employment status.  The minimum wage
rates and covered sector apply only to employees, while the large proportion of workers who
work outside of the wage sector2 , non-employee workers3 , can be considered as members of
the uncovered sector.  There is also the mobility between these two sectors that is required of
the two-sector model: Manning (2000) argued that employees in Indonesia are flexible enough
to shift into informal activities as a response to a contraction in labour demand.  More detail
about the employment status in Indonesia is presented in Chapter 3.
1 This assumes the absence of queuing for covered sector jobs, which is addressed in the next sub-section.
2 In year 2000, workers in uncovered sector comprised 67% of total employment.
3 Non-employee workers are: self-employed workers, employers with permanent workers and unpaid workers.
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2.2.3.Two-Sector Model with Queuing for Covered-Sector Jobs
Mincer (1976) formalised this model as an extension of the two-sector model.  It provides
the link that relates the effects of a minimum wage to unemployment.  Hence Mincer’s
approach permits the introduction of a minimum wage to be analysed in terms of the effects
on unemployment as well as on employment.
Mincer assumed that workers choose the sector that offers the highest expected wage.
This is given by the probability of obtaining a job in a particular sector times the wage rate in
that sector.  The covered sector has a (minimum) wage (Wc) greater than that in the uncovered
sector (Wu).  But the probability of obtaining a covered sector job (Pc) is less than one whereas
an uncovered job can be obtained with certainty.  Equilibrium in the model requires the
equality of the expected wage in each sector.  The imposition of a minimum wage that is
higher than the equilibrium rate would make a certain amount of “waiting” for jobs in the
covered sector worthwhile, thus creating  a fixed amount  of  unemployment  (Mincer, 1976,
p. S89). Here unemployment is interpreted as queuing for covered-sector jobs.
According to Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982), this model makes the overly strong
assumption that workers are unlikely to search for covered-sector jobs while employed in the
uncovered sector.  If the two sectors are geographically separate, this assumption would be
realistic.  In Indonesia, however, the coverage of the minimum wage depends on employment
status (employee or non-employee) and so the markets will not be geographically separate.
However, in many cases it appears as if uncovered sector jobs are employments of last resort
for many workers.  That is, the workers will work in one sector until circumstances force a
change in employment type.  They then will seek work in the other sector.  Hence, activity
(search or employment) in the alternative sectors is separated by a time dimension.  This is
consistent with the model outlined above.
2.2.4.The Monopsony Model
In the monopsony labour market, there is effectively only one buyer of labour, so its
labour supply schedule is that of the labour market itself.  As described in section 2.2.2, this
labour supply function relates wage rates to the number of persons seeking employment.
Since the labour supply is a positive function of the wages paid, the firms can attract and
retain more workers only if they pay a higher wage.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium wage and employment in a monopsonistic labour
market.
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A monopsonist maximizes profit by hiring the amount of labour at E0, which equates
the marginal cost of labour (MCL) to the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL).  Since
there is only one firm hiring in this market, E0 is also total market employment.
Having chosen this level of employment, the monopsonist then offers the wage that
will obtain E0 at minimum cost.  This generates an equilibrium wage of W0.  At this wage level,
workers are paid less than their marginal value to the firm.  This known as monopsonistic
exploitation (Fleisher and Kniesner, 1984) and can be measured by the vertical distance AB.
Suppose that a minimum wage equal to Wm is imposed on the labour market.  With this
minimum wage, the labour supply curve is the kinked line WmDS.   To the left of point D, the
supply curve becomes a horizontal line at the value Wm, because workers are prevented from
offering their services for less than the minimum wage.  To the right of point D, the supply
curve follows S, because workers ask a wage rate above the minimum wage level (Wm) in
order to supply amounts of labour more than E2.
The firm’s marginal cost curve becomes horizontal at the minimum wage for amounts
of labour less than or equal to E2.  When the quantity of labour exceeds E2, the marginal cost
follows WmD, then jumps up to E, and follows MCL again.  With this new marginal cost of
labour schedule, the monopsonist hires the amount of labour that equates its MRPL to its MC.
This occurs at point C and the equilibrium employment and wage become E1 and Wm.
Figure 2
The Monopsonistic Labour Market
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The result is that a minimum wage between W0 and W1 will increase both the wage and
employment above their monopsonistic values, W0 and E0.  This conclusion can be taken as
a possible explanation of the Card-Krueger findings that are reviewed in the empirical
literature section below.  They suggest that the imposition of the minimum wage can potentially
increase employment at affected firms and in the industry as a whole (Card and Krueger,
1994, 1995).
2.2.5.Efficiency-Wage Models
Traditional neoclassical production theory views wages as determined by prices and
labour productivity. However, in reality, compensation has complex incentive properties,
and there may be causal links running not just from productivity to wages, but also from
wages to productivity.
The central assumption of efficiency-wage models is that there is a benefit as well as a
cost to a firm of paying a higher wage (Romer, 1996).  According to Mankiw (1997), economists
have proposed various theories to explain how wages affect worker productivity.  One
efficiency-wage theory holds that wages influence nutrition.  A higher wage can increase
workers’ food consumption, and thereby cause them to be better nourished and more
productive.  A second efficiency-wage theory holds that high wages reduce labour turnover.
By paying a high wage, a firm reduces the frequency of quits, thereby decreasing the time
spent hiring and training new workers.  A third theory holds that the higher are wages, the
higher the average quality of the firm’s work force.  A fourth theory holds that a higher wage
can increase workers’ effort in situations where the firm cannot monitor them perfectly.  All
these theories indicate that the firm operates more efficiently if it pays its workers above the
competitive equilibrium wage rate.
These efficiency-wage theories hold that high wages make workers more productive.
As cited by Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982), it can be argued that if employers do not
minimise costs, there is the possibility that they will respond to a minimum wage increase by
raising the productivity of their operation to offset the increase.  Wages above the average
would increase incentives to work and lead to better economic performance, through lower
absenteeism and better adaptation of workers.
2.3. Overview of the Empirical Studies
The theoretical effects of a minimum wage seem to be ambiguous. The competitive
labour market model suggests that the introduction of a minimum wage that raises the wages
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of some workers would automatically reduce the employment prospects of that particular
category of workers. This simple textbook ‘proof’ of the effect of a minimum wage seems to be
what most people have in mind.  A survey by Kearl, Pope, Whiting and Wimmer in 1979
showed that 90% of economists working at universities, in government and in the business
sector in the United States generally agreed, or agreed with provisions, with the statement
that ‘A minimum wage increases unemployment among young and unskilled workers.’  The
monopsony and efficiency wage models, however, suggest that the link between wages and
employment is not automatically negative, and might be positive. These ambiguous theoretical
conclusions are also reflected in the available empirical evidence.
In a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on minimum wages from the
United States, Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) concluded that the empirical evidence was
generally in accord with the standard theory.  To examine the effects of the minimum wage on
teenagers, two sorts of studies were surveyed, namely, time-series studies of teenagers and
youth and cross-section studies of teenagers.  It is important to note the restriction of the main
focus of the Brown et al. (1982) survey: they examine teenagers and youth as these are among
the lowest paid workers and so minimum wages are more likely to be effective in these
employment markets.4
(i) Time-Series Studies of Teenagers and Youth
Time series studies make use of regression techniques to isolate the independent impact
of changes over time in minimum wages on employment.  Brown et al. (1982) synthesised
the results of 25 previous time series studies conducted up to 1981, most of which focused
on the teenage labour market. The studies used a single equation model of the type:
Y = f (MW, D, X1….Xn)
where the dependent variable Y is a measure of labour force status.  The independent
variables include MW as a measure of the minimum wage, D as an aggregate demand
(business cycle) variable to account for changes in the level of economic activity, and
X1….Xn representing a host of other exogenous explanatory variables to control for labour
supply, school enrollment, participation in the armed forces, and the like.
The key variable, the minimum wage, has generally been measured by the ratio of the
nominal legal minimum wage to average hourly earnings weighted by coverage, the so-
called Kaitz Index.  The weight applied in this calculation is the number of persons
employed in the specific group analysed as a proportion of total employment.
4 An effective minimum wage is one that is imposed above the market clearing wage.  A minimum wage imposed
below the market clearing wage, as might be the case for older or skilled workers, is said to be ineffective.
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The main summary finding from these time-series econometric studies is that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage reduces employment among teenagers by 1 percent to 3
percent, holding other factors constant.  Table 1 below is adapted from Brown et al.’s
(1982) literature review.
1. Kaitz (1970) 1954-1968 - 0.98
2. Kosters and Welch (1972) 1954-1968 - 2.96
3. Kelly (1975) 1954-1968 - 1.20
4. Kelly (1976) 1954-1974 - 0.66
5. Gramlich (1976) 1948-1975 - 0.94
6. Hashimoto and Mincer (19.70)
and Mincer (1976) 1954-1969 - 2.31
7. Welch (1976) 1954-1968 - 1.78
8. Ragan (1977) 1963-1972 - 0.65
9. Mattila (1978) 1947-1976 - 0.84
10. Freeman (1979) 1948-1977 - 2.46
11. Wachter and Kim (1979) 1962-1978 - 2.52
12. Iden (1980) 1954-1979 - 2.26
13. Abowd and Killingsworth (1981) 1954-1979 - 2.13
14. Betsey and Dunson (1981) 1954-1979 - 1.39
15. Boschen and Grossman (1981) 1948-1979 - 1.50
16. Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1981) 1954-1979 - 0.96
17. Hamermesh (1981) 1954-1978 - 1.21
18. Ragan (1981) 1963-1978 - 0.52
Table 1
Estimated Impact of a 10 Percent Change in the Minimum Wage
on Teenagers 16-19 Years
NO STUDY PERIOD CHANGE  IN
EMPLOYMENT (%)
Source: Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982, pp.498 and 504), Tables 1 and 3
All studies find a negative employment effect for all teenagers together.  In addition,
the elasticity5  signs are almost exclusively negative for the various age-sex-race subgroups
considered.  The other consistent finding is the unemployment effects of the higher minimum
wage are considerably weaker than the disemployment effects because of the withdrawal
from the labour force by teenagers in response to a decline in job-prospects.  This suggests
there is a form of “uncovered” sector for teenagers.  It takes the form of the schools sector and
non-participation in either the labour market or the schools sector.6
5 The elasticity indicates the proportional change in employment, given a proportional change in the minimum
wage.
6 In 1999, the number of people aged 15-24 in Indonesia who were not working because they were attending school
was 10,733,276  (27.42% of all people aged 15-24) and the number who were not involved in either the labour
market or the schools sector was 8,209,731 (20.97% of all people aged  15-24).
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(ii) Cross-Section Studies of Teenagers
The cross-section approach involves comparing states or metropolitan areas which differ
in the relative importance of their minimum wage.  This could be because of variations in
the minimum wages across areas (due to State laws) or because of variations in the
market wages across areas (due, for instance, to differing levels of economic activity).  The
survey covered studies that focus on differences in State laws and also those of the effect
of the Federal minimum wage on different states.
Representative estimates of the employment effects of a 10 percent change in the minimum
wage based on these cross-section studies are presented in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Estimated Impact of a 10 Percent Change in the Minimum Wage
on Teenagers 16-19 Years
1. Welch and Cunningham (1978) 1970 - 4.82
2. Freeman (1979) 1970 - 3.22
3. Cunningham (1981) 1970
Employment - 0.24
Full-time Equivalent Employment 0.15
NO STUDY YEAR CHANGE  IN
EMPLOYMENT (%)
Source: Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982, pp.510 and 511), Tables 4 and 5
With a smaller number of studies, empirical studies using cross-sectional data produce
a  wider  range  of  estimates than the time-series results.  Most studies,  however, suggest that
a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment rates among teenagers by
about the 1-3 percent range that was found in the time-series studies.
This negative relationship between minimum rates of pay and employment levels
established by Brown et al. (1982) in their early survey carries across to more recent studies.
Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995), for example, investigated the employment effects of the
more recent increases in the Federal minimum wage in the United States, from $3.35 to $3.80
on April 1, 1990 and then to $4.25 on April 1, 1991.  They compared changes in employment
rates of high and low-wage populations.  Table 3 below lists changes in employment rates
relative to the 1989 levels.
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Table 3
Percentage of Low-wage Workers and
the Percentage Change in Employment/Population Ratios
Over Levels for April 1, 1989 – March 31, 1990
Men Women
Group Fraction
low-wage
Employment
change
Fraction
low-wage
Employment
change
Age:
15 – 19
20 – 24
25 – 64
65 – 69
Race:
Black
White
Asian
Spanish ethnicity:
Mexican
Other Spanish
Non Spanish
Years of school
completed:
Less than 12
12
More than 12
Marital status:
Single
Married
States:
10 lowest-wage
Middle-wage
10 highest-wage
All
44.5
14.2
3.3
14.0
11.0
7.2
5.4
15.6
8.8
7.1
20.7
6.0
3.5
15.1
2.7
13.1
7.9
3.5
7.5
-15.4
-5.6
-2.5
-4.3
-4.8
-3.1
+0.7
-4.8
-3.3
-3.2
-6.6
-4.0
-2.8
-4.4
-2.4
-1.5
-3.4
-4.0
-3.2
51.8
19.0
8.8
21.0
16.9
13.0
9.3
21.9
16.4
12.9
35.4
13.5
6.4
18.4
9.0
23.7
14.2
5.6
13.3
-12.99
-4.3
-0.3
+3.5
-3.4
-0.6
-0.3
-5.5
-0.7
-0.8
-7.3
-2.2
-0.7
-3.2
+0.7
+0.0
-0.7
-2.9
-1.1
Source: Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995, p.235), Table 3
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The results in Table 3 show that the group with the highest percentage of low-wage
workers (in italics) is also the group whose employment shows the greatest drop.  For example,
the age comparisons show that employment declines are greatest for those aged 15-19, since
this group has the highest incidence of low wage workers.  Comparisons across racial groups
indicate that black workers, the group with the highest percentage of low-wage workers,
experienced the largest employment losses.  This emphasises the importance of the distinction
between effective and ineffective minimum wages.  A given minimum rate of pay will be
effective for low wage earners only, and hence will have greater impact on the low-skilled
sector of the workforce.
It can be seen that there are exceptions to this general finding, namely the gender and
geographic splits. The employment rate of women does not fall relative to the rate of men and
low-wage employment does not fall more in low-wage states than in higher-wage states.
Deere, Murphy and Welch argued that the minimum wage responses are swamped by the
broader trends of increasing labour-market participation of women and by the stronger
employment growth in high-wage states than in low-wage states7 .   However, if men and
women are viewed separately, the increases in the minimum wage coincide with shifts toward
less employment for lower-wage workers within each gender.  Similarly for the across-State
comparisons that allow for gender effects, where it is found that employment of low-wage
workers falls relative to those who typically earn more both in high-wage and low-wage
states.
Although most economists believe that, consistent with the evidence reviewed above,
increases in the minimum wage reduce employment among workers with little skill and
experience, some studies question this conclusion.  In September 1994, David Card and Alan
Krueger published a study on minimum wages with a focus on the New Jersey minimum
wage increase in 1992, where this State raised its minimum wage to $5.05, while the
neighbouring State of Pennsylvania kept the Federal rate of $4.25.  They examined the fast
food industry as the leading employers of low wage earners and an industry that enforces the
minimum wage.  Their analysis was based on establishment surveys conducted prior to the
increase in the minimum wage and after the minimum wage was increased.  The first wave of
the survey was conducted a little over a month before the scheduled increase in New Jersey’s
minimum wage.  The second wave was conducted about eight months after the minimum-
wage increase.  Table 4 summarises the levels and changes in average employment per store
by state in their survey.
7 There was an employment expansion in the South and Southwest where wages were lower than in the Northeast,
Upper Midwest, and West.
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Rows 1 and 2 of the table present data on full-time equivalent employment before
(wave 1 of the survey) and after (wave 2 of the survey) the increases in New Jersey’s minimum
wage, from all available observations.  The changes in average employment between waves
1 and 2 are shown in row 3.  An alternative estimate of the change is presented in row 4:  in
this row, the computation of the change in employment is restricted to the subsample of
stores that reported valid employment data in both waves (the balanced subsample).  Row 5
presents the average change in employment in the balanced subsample, treating employment
at temporarily closed stores in wave 2 as zero, rather than as missing.
After the rise in the minimum wage, stores in New Jersey grew relative to stores in
Pennsylvania, with the relative gain being 2.76 FTE employees.  When the analysis is restricted
to the balanced subsample, the relative change is virtually identical (2.75) to that reported for
the full sample, and only slightly smaller (2.51) when employment at temporarily closed
stores in wave 2 is treated as zero. Thus this study indicated that employment actually
expanded in New Jersey relative to Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage was constant.
Table 4
Average Employment per Store by State
Before and After the Rise in New Jersey Minimum Wage
1. Full-Time-Equivalent (FTE) 23.33 20.44 -2.89
 employment before, all available
observations.
2. FTE employment after, all available 21.17 21.03 -0.14
observations
3. Change in mean FTE employment -2.16 0.59 2.76
4. Change in mean FTE employment, -2.28 0.47 2.75
balanced sample of stores
5. Change in mean FTE employment, -2.28 0.23 2.51
setting FTE at temporarily closed
stores to 0
Source: Card and Krueger (1994, p.780), Table 3
Store by State
Difference,
NJ – PA
(iii)
New Jersey
(NJ)
(ii)
Pennsylvania
(PA)
(i)
Variable
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Card and Krueger also compared the low-wage ($4.25 per hour in wave 1) and high-
wage ($5.00 or more per hour in wave 1) stores in New Jersey before and after the new
minimum wage.  This comparison showed that employment expanded at the low-wage
stores and contracted at the high-wage stores.  This comparison provides a specification test
of the validity of the Pennsylvania control group in that the minimum wage is less likely to be
effective in the high wage stores in New Jersey and so the employment behaviour in these
stores is expected to resemble that in the stores in Pennsylvania.
In some additional research that they conducted using data from other states, Card
and Krueger found a positive correlation between a higher minimum wage and employment.
The Card-Krueger study leads us to believe that employers demand more labour as its price
rises.
According to Mankiw (1997), one possible explanation of this result is that firms have
some market power in the labour market.  As shown in section 2.3.4, a monopsonistic firm
buys less labour at a lower wage than a competitive firm would.  The monopsonistic firm
reduces employment in order to depress the wage it has to pay.  A minimum wage prevents
the monopsonistic firm from following this strategy and so can increase employment.
However, most economists are sceptical of the monopsony explanation, since most firms
compete with many other firms for workers.
The Card-Krueger findings have sparked considerable controversy among labour
economists and have generated much debate in academic and political circles.  Their data
have been criticized, and researchers working with better data have shown the result is
reversed.  A follow-up investigation by Neumark and Wascher (1995) showed that Card
and Krueger collected their data incorrectly.  In particular, the data collected by Card and
Krueger appear to indicate greater employment variation over the eight-month period
between their surveys than do payroll data.  Moreover, even if the Card-Krueger data were
correct, one can argue that their study searched for effects across too few industries and
allowed too little time to elapse (Miller, 1995).  Richard Berman of the Employment Policies
Institute also disagreed with the methodology of the Card and Kruger study. He argued
that the analysis should have focused  on  the  number  of hours worked instead of the
number of employees (Berman, 1998).
In the context of Indonesia, Rama (2001) has attempted to assess the impact of minimum
wage policy on the labour market.  Based on the results of an econometric analysis of data
from 27 provinces for the period from 1988 to 1995, minimum wage policies were shown to
have had a modest impact on labour market outcomes.  The starting point for his analysis
was a basic equation of the type:
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where R is an indicator of labour productivity.  In his study, Rama used five different indicators
of labour productivity: average earnings of urban labourers, average wage in manufacturing,
labour costs per worker in large manufacturing, value added per worker in large
manufacturing, and GDP per worker excluding oil and gas.
The elasticity in this specification can be calculated as                    ,   where        is    the sample
mean of MWit/Rit and  is the sample mean of Lit/Nit.  Rama’s results show that the estimated
elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wages is statistically significant in only
one of the specifications, but it has the same sign (negative) in four of them and is close to zero
in the fifth one.  Therefore, it can be argued that higher minimum wages reduce wage
employment in Indonesia.
Finally, Rama concluded that the doubling of the minimum wage in the first half of the
1990s led to an increase in average wages in the range of 5 to 15 percent, and a decrease in
urban wage employment in the range of 0 to 5 percent.  However, he suggested that while the
disemployment effects appeared to be considerable in small manufacturing firms, employment
may have actually increased in large firms. The workers in large firms are the winners from
the increases in the minimum wage as their wages increase and there appears to be little risk
that they will lose their jobs.
It is important to note that the main focus of Rama’s study was the effects of increases
in minimum wages for the whole aggregate of workers.  However, as noted above, the impacts
of increases in minimum wages on the various groups of workers are not the same, but fall
mostly on the groups of workers who are sensitive to variations in parameters of a minimum
wage regime.  A focus on the specific groups of workers such as females, youth workers, and
itiiitit MWfZ ετθ +++= )(
where Zit is an economic outcome in province i and year t, MWit is the minimum wage in
province i and year t,          is a province-specific effect (e.g. infrastructure, natural resources,
demography, etc.),        is a year-specific effect (e.g. macroeconomic policies, external shocks,
the investment climate, etc.) and         is a stochastic disturbance.
In examining the impact of minimum wages on employment, Rama used a particular
version of the basic equation above.  Specifically, the economic outcome focused on by Rama
was the ratio of employment to population, that is Zit = Lit/Nit.  The equation to be estimated
was:
itiiitititit RMWbbNL ετθ ++++= )/(/ 21
iθ
iτ
itε
λµ /2b µ
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where           and         are labour supply and labour demand respectively,             represents wages,
          represents    the minimum wage,        is a vector of labour supply shifters,         is a vector
of labour demand shifters, while                      and              are vectors of parameters.
In equilibrium, labour supply is equal to labour demand, and hence:
=
The reduced form solutions for wages and employment are:
less educated workers would have been more informative.  This issue becomes a consideration
in the more current study by Suryahadi, et al. (2001).
Suryahadi, et al. (2001) use data from 26 provinces, covering the period from 1988 to
1999, to analyse the impact of minimum wages on different groups of workers within the
urban formal sector.  They defined supply and demand for workers as follows:
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where        ,                ,                      ,                           ,
       ,         ,               ,
The parameters of main interest are           and         , that is how the  minimum  wage
affects wages and employment.  The wage regression results indicate that the impact of
minimum wages on average wages across the workforce is mixed.  The wages of some workers
are pushed up by minimum wages, while the wages of others are depressed by minimum
wages.
wΩ lΩ
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The results of employment regression indicate that the elasticity of total employment to
the minimum wage is –0.112 and statistically significant.  This implies that every 10 percent
increase in real minimum wages will result in a 1.1 percent reduction in total employment.
The coefficients for female, youth and less educated workers are also negative and statistically
significant.  The only group of workers which benefit from the minimum wage are white-
collar workers.  A 10 percent increase in the real minimum wage is suggested to increase the
employment of white-collar workers by 10 percent.
2.4. Conclusion
The theoretical models outlined in this chapter attempt to explain the correlation
between the change in minimum wages and employment.  According to the competitive
models, an increase in the minimum wage that leads to an increase in wages, and which does
not correspond to an increase in productivity, would have the effect of reducing employment.
Several criticisms have been advanced against this competitive model.  The main one
focuses on the fact that the firm is not always a price taker in the labour market (Ghellab,
1998).  The alternative models (monopsony and efficiency-wage) suggest that the link between
minimum wages and employment is not automatically negative, and might even be positive.
Most of the available empirical evidence on the effects of increases in the minimum
wage on employment supports the standard theory that increases in the minimum wage tend
to reduce aggregate employment rates and increase unemployment rates.
THE MINIMUM WAGE IN INDONESIA
3.1. Introduction
The first section of this chapter briefly illustrates the labour market situation in the
rapidly changing Indonesian economy.  Some key statistics on the Indonesian labour force
are presented in this section.  The second section describes the practice with respect to
minimum wages in Indonesia.  This includes an illustration of the minimum wage
development and several key problems in its implementation.  Finally, we end the chapter
with some concluding remarks.
3.2. The Labour Market Situation
With a large labour force, a high unemployment rate and a rapidly expanding labour
market, Indonesia has fairly unique economic circumstances.  Manning (1994, 1998b) describes
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The Indonesian labour force grew from 88,186,772 in 1996 to 94,847,178 in 1999 (7.6%
growth).  The labour force participation rate was relatively stable between 66 and 68 percent,
suggesting that much of the growth in the labour force is due to growth in the population.
The proportion of female and youth labour force also did not change much during the period
reviewed.  The female labour force varied a little, between 38 and 39 percent of all labour force
participants.  Similarly, the youth labour force fluctuated between 21 and 23 percent of all
labour force participants.  It is apparent from the table that there is a large proportion of less
educated workers in labour market.  However, this proportion decreased from 78.8% in 1996
to 76.3% in 1999.
Indonesia is also undergoing rapid structural transformation from agriculture into
manufacturing and services. This transformation, however, has been associated with
employment patterns that have changed less rapidly than those of output.  The reasons
behind this are primarily the slow rate of labour movement out of low productivity sectors,
especially agriculture, and multiple jobs holding across sectors in the process of the shift out
of agriculture (Hill 1996, p. 21).  Figure 3 shows the distribution of workers across the main
sectors.
It is clearly apparent from Figure 3 that the agricultural sector accounts for the largest
share of employment in Indonesia.  However, between 1996 and 1997, there was a
redistribution of the share of employment away from agriculture and towards the
the labour market in Indonesia as having low wages, long working hours, harsh labour
management, poor working conditions, utilisation of under legal working age workers, and
high rates of informalisation compared with other Asian countries.   Table 5 presents some
recent labour force characteristics for Indonesia.
Table 5
The Indonesian Labour Force Characteristics
Years 1996-1999
a: aged 15-24 years old
b: no schooling, unfinished primary, primary, lower secondary
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik /BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia)
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9
Size of labour force (millions) 88.2 89.6 92.7 94.8
Labour force participation rate (%) 66.9 66.3 66.9 67.2
Female labour force (% of the total labour force) 38.5 38.3 38.8 38.4
Youth labour force (% of the total labour force)a 22.3 21.5 21.3 21.3
Less educated labour force (% of the total labour force)b 78.8 77.9 75.8 76.3
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manufacturing and services sectors.  Thus employment in agriculture fell from 36.5 million
(43.5% of total employment) in 1996 to 34.8 million (40.7%) in 1997.  During the economic
crisis that affected the Asian region in 1997, workers in the manufacturing and services
sectors who lost their jobs moved to the rural region and worked on the farms. This
phenomenon increased agriculture’s employment to 39.4 million (45.0%) in 1998, while the
employment of manufacturing and services decreased from 16.3 million (19.1%) and 34.3
million (40.2%) in 1997 to 14.3 million (16.3%) and 34.0 million (38.8%) in 1998.  When the
economy started to recover in 1999, employment in the manufacturing and services sectors
increased to 15.8 million (17.8%) and 34.6 million (39.0%), respectively.
The impact of the economic crisis on employment in Indonesia was, in fact, less than
had been expected. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) had predicted that perhaps
as many as 10-14 million people would find themselves without jobs in 1998 (Cameron,
1999).  However, the actual employment loss was more likely around 2 million8 .  The key
explanations for this better than expected outcome are: the capability of people to find a new
job after being cut back from wage employment, and the willingness of employees to accept
lower wages, accept shorter work hours and obtain fewer employee benefits (Booth 1999,
Manning 2000).  Thus, there has been high flexibility in labour market adjustment combined
with disobedience of employers toward minimum wage legislation, and low enforcement of
Figure 3
The Distribution of the Work Force
Years 1996-1999
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik /BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia)
  
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
40,000,000
45,000,000
1996 1997 1998 1999
Years
Em
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
Agriculture
Manuf actur ing
Services
8 The number of people who left their jobs between August 1997 and August 1998 is 4,279,000.  Of these, 51.1%
or 2,188,000 were finding new jobs, of which 35.2% were in wage-jobs and 64.8% in non-wage jobs.
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the legislation that further weakens the bargaining power of workers such that they have no
better choice than to accept wages below the legal rate.  Therefore, regarding this labour
market situation, discussion about the minimum wage in Indonesia and its impact on
employment is of considerable interest.
3.3. The Minimum Wage in Practice
Minimum Wage Regulation was first introduced in Indonesia in the early era of the
New Order Regime9 , when economic activity was still dominated by home industries, and
small and middle sized firms.  The objective of this regulation was as a measure that would
supposedly protect workers’ interests, raise labour productivity, reduce widespread corruption
and stimulate economic activity through a spending effect (Manning, 1993).  At that time, the
minimum wages were set for construction workers on government projects in Jakarta, and
then applied to all workers in general and for other regions.
Since the middle of the 1980s, new legislation was established to regularise the
haphazard system of minimum wages that had been in force in most regions (Rama, 2001).
The government set the minimum wages with reference to the cost of living, labour market
conditions and Minimum Physical Need/KFM (Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum).  The KFM is
measured by the estimation of a worker’s minimum need in 4 main groups of consumption
bundles: food, housing, clothing and a selected other items group. Each group contains a
range of items that are considered vital for a single worker to live adequately.
In 1996, the KFM was adjusted with a wider range of consumption bundle and
recognised as a Minimum Living Need/KHM (Kebutuhan Hidup Minimum) that represents a
higher standard of living than KFM.10   The KHM bundle consists of 43 items: 11 items in the
food group, 19 items in the housing group, 8 items in the clothing group and 5 items in the
selected other items group.  The improvement of the KHM always becomes a target for policy
practitioners in the field of employment management.
The minimum wages are determined differently among the provinces in Indonesia.
The background behind this policy was the difference of economic structure of the main
groups of islands (Inkiriwang, 2001). It can be seen from the data in 2000 that among the
groups of islands in Indonesia, Java, Bali and Sumatera have dominated economy activity,
accounting for about 80% of Indonesia’s GDP and also of the country’s population. The table
below describes the distribution of population and GDP in Indonesia.
9 The New Order Regime from 1966 until 1998, under Soeharto, acted as a ‘state authoritarian corporatist and
exclusionary system’ with high state control (Ford, 1999).
10 As cited from “Upah Minimum Sebuah Kajian Tentang Dampaknya Terhadap Penciptaan Lapangan Kerja di
Masa Krisis” (Minimum Wage, An Analysis of the Impact of Job Creation during Crisis Era).
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In practice, however, until the late 1980s the minimum wage policy was ineffective.
Minimum wages were introduced largely for ‘cosmetic reasons’ (Manning, 1998a, p.116).  In
large part this was because the government tightly controlled the labour movement by
recognising only a single trade union confederation11  (Lambert 1993, Nusantara 1995, Storey
2000).  In contrast, in other countries, such as Australia, trade unions are a crucial part of the
wage setting process (Miller & Mulvey, 1989).  The strong political dictatorship in Indonesia
during the New Order Regime prevented unionism from realizing its potential for autonomous
action (Hess, 1990) and furthermore the political considerations were frequently more
important than economic demands in unions (Hess 1997, Sidik & Iskandaryah 1993, Suwarno
& Elliot 2000).  As a result, Manning (1994) pointed out there was little effective direct
government or union involvement in the setting of wages.
Moreover, disobedience of employers in Indonesia with respect to the payment of
minimum wages, low sanctions imposed on offenders12  and mild enforcement of legislation
by government have all meant that this policy has had little impact on the labour market
(Manning 1993, Gall 1998).  There was also a lack of regular and genuine inspection, with
only 700 labour inspectors to monitor 147,000 companies in 1990, and there are routinely
bribes to ignore malpractices (Gall 1998, p. 367).   Hess (1997, p. 37) noted that the reason
employers often pay less than the minimum wage was the widespread nature of a “patron-
client relationship”13  in employment relations.  This gives employers the opportunity to gain
Table 6
Distribution of Population and GDP by Main Island Group (%)
 Year 2000
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik /BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia)
ISLAND GROUP POPULATION GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Sumatera 20.96 22.05
Java & Bali 60.71 59.56
Kalimantan 5.41 10.17
Sulawesi 7.09 4.49
Others 5.82 3.73
TOTAL 100 100
11 This union was not designed to represent workers in Indonesia, but it was designed to control their movement
(Gall, 1998, p. 366)
12 As cited in Gall (1998, p. 367), penalties for violation of labour laws are too low (three months jail sentence and
$US 55 fine) to have any punitive effect.
13 This relationship is influenced by Javanese culture, with an emphasis on formal behaviour and acceptance of
authority (Hess 1997, p. 37).
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wage flexibility and has undermined the protection employees derive, in principle, from state
regulation of minimum wages. Patron–client relationships are very strong in the public
sector due to the major domination of Javanese officers in this sector14.
There was a turning point for Indonesian industrial relations in 1987.  At this time
there was international pressure towards Indonesia, charging Indonesia with breaching
international agreed labour standards by allowing only one government controlled union.
This international pressure has had a dramatic impact on the development of independent
unionism (Gall 1998, Abdullah and Etty 1995, Lambert 1993). The development of independent
unionism also was supported by several complaints under the Generalised Scheme of
Preferences (GSP)15 , which threatened to deprive Indonesia of low tariffs on its exports to the
US market (Hess 1997, Rama 1996).  These independent unions, supported by Non
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Commission on Human Rights16 have presented
a major challenge for the government17  and have been very important in the fight for better
terms of employment of workers18 .  The waves of strikes19  with wages as a major cause have
placed significant pressure on the government to increase wages.  The result has been a series
of gradual increases in the minimum wage (Manning 1998 , KOMPAS 2000). The strike
indeed has had such an impact that 90% of factories are now paying the minimum wage20
(Gall 1998, p. 371).
The importance of minimum wages as a key element of economic and social policy
has been a consideration in the recent years when the government has strongly pursued
a minimum wage policy. The levels of minimum wages were increased very significantly
(Inkiriwang, 2001). This situation has been pursued because of the growing realization
by workers of the big differences in wealth between themselves and their employers,
supported by the activities of the NGOs and the willingness of journalists to cover these
stories (Gall, 1998, p. 371).  Table 7 below illustrates the minimum wage development in
Indonesia.
14 But this patron-client relationship has been limited by foreign and Chinese ownership of enterprise in the private
sector.
15 The General System of Preferences is a facility under which Indonesia has a concession on export activity to the
United States and the removal of this will make Indonesian products more expensive in the United States.
16 This was established in 1993 as a response to international pressure in 1987.
17 The Manpower Minister and other government officers did, however, indicate their opposition to this development
and took the decision not to recognise formally or give support (financial or other) to the new organisation
(Manning, 1993, p.79).
18 Unfortunately, there is much evidence of the existence of repression and restrictive regulations imposed on the
independent unions (Beth 2001 (a)(b), Manning 1998b).
19 There are 188 cases of labour strikes during 1985 and 1987 (data source: http://laborsta.ilo.org).
20 The power of unionism in Indonesia as a threat for the employers to pay higher wages has become significant, as
in the case of Australia (Australia’s case is discussed in Miller, Mulvey & Neo, 1997).
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Table 7
Minimum Wages, Inflation and KHM
Years 1997-1999
1997 135,676 11.1 141,953 95.6
1998 155,719 14.8 77.6 - 62.8 205,112 75.9
1999 182,391 17.1 2.0   15.1 252,996 72.1
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia) and Bank Indonesia
 (Central Bank of Republic of Indonesia)
YEARS
(1)
MW
(2)
MW
GROWTH
(3)
INFLATION
(4)
(3) – (4)
(5)
KHM
(6)
MW/KHM
(7)
It can be seen from Table 7 that minimum wages have been increased significantly in
nominal terms (columns 2 and 3).  The minimum wage was almost at the level of the KHM
(95.6%) in 1997, and was increased by 14.8% in 1998.  However, in real terms it fell drastically
in 1998 due to the high inflation (77.6%) that swept the country during the economic crisis.
In 1998, the inflation rates in the provinces’ capital cities ranged from 61.8% to 97.8%.  In
1999, the inflation rate was quite low (2.0%), but the cost of the components of the KHM was
high.21  As a result, the minimum wage was only 72.1% of the KHM.  Moreover, the ratio of
minimum wage to KHM was smaller in 1999 than in 1998, which indicated a decreasing
level of workers’ welfare.  Table 8  presents the ratio of minimum wage to KHM by province
in 1999.
The table clearly shows that minimum wages were below the KHM in each province.
This is may be the reason why governments increased the regional minimum wages every
year.  The highest ratio of minimum wage to KHM was in Sumatera Utara (80.5%) and the
lowest ratio was in DI Aceh (55.6%).
As noted in section 2.2.2, many workers are not covered by minimum wage
legislation, particularly in developing countries.  In the context of Indonesia, minimum
wage rates only apply to employees.22  Coverage does not embrace self-employed
workers23, employers with permanent workers24 , and unpaid workers.25   This segment
21 The high cost of the KHM was because of the impact of price increases in the previous year.
22 An employee is a person who works for another person or an institution for pay in cash or in kind.
23 A self-employed worker is a person who works at her/his own risk with/without the assistance of his/her family
members or temporary workers.
24 An employer with permanent workers is a person who does his/her business assisted by paid permanent workers.
25 An unpaid worker is a person who works without pay in an economic enterprise operated by other members of the
family, relatives or neighbours.
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Table 8
The Minimum Wages and KHM by Province
Year 1999
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik /BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia)
DI Aceh 171,000 307,603 55.6
Sumatera Utara 210,000 261,000 80.5
Sumatera Barat 160,000 251,712 63.6
Riau 242,000 355,515 68.1
Jambi 150,000 215,463 69.6
Sumatera Selatan 175,500 251,586 69.8
Bengkulu 150,000 210,162 71.4
Lampung 160,000 220,500 72.6
DKI Jakarta 231,000 351,263 65.8
Jawa Barat 208,750 330,949 63.1
Jawa Tengah 153,000 235,750 64.0
DI Yogyakarta 130,000 227,064 57.3
Jawa Timur 170,500 251,371 67.8
Bali 176,500 288,000 61.3
Nusa Tenggara Barat 145,000 257,150 56.4
Nusa Tenggara Timur 143,000 237,425 60.2
Kalimantan Barat 175,000 255,707 68.4
Kalimantan Tengah 195,000 335,442 58.1
Kalimantan Selatan 166,000 233,721 71.0
Kalimantan Timur 194,000 317,704 61.1
Sulawesi Utara 155,000 248,706 62.3
Sulawesi Tengah 150,000 240,000 62.5
Sulawesi Selatan 148,000 257,035 57.6
Sulawesi Tenggara 160,000 254,250 62.9
Maluku 180,000 223,968 80.4
Papua 225,000 331,579 67.9
PROVINCES MINIMUM WAGES KHM RATIO (%)
of employment can be considered as an uncovered sector.  Table 9  describes the main
employment states in Indonesia.
The fraction of employees is only around 33% of total employment (35.45% in 1997,
32.85% in 1998, 33.08% in 1999, and 33.03% in 2000).  The remainder of employed persons
are excluded from coverage.  Not surprisingly, these groups of workers are often among the
lowest paid in the workforce.
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3.4. Conclusion
Indonesia has a large labour force, a high unemployment rate and a rapidly expanding
labour market.  The Indonesian labour market comprises a large proportion of workers who
are very vulnerable to changes in labour market conditions.  These groups include females,
youth workers and less educated workers.   Of particular note is the fact that less educated
workers account for about 77% of the Indonesian labour force.
With these unique economic circumstances, the importance of minimum wages has
been a major consideration in the recent years after being largely symbolic for almost two
decades (Rama, 2001).  This was happened when the government strongly pursued a
minimum wage policy.  The levels of regional minimum wages have been increased
significantly in nominal terms.  However, the economic crisis that started in 1997 and deepened
in 1998 has reduced the minimum wage in real terms, and this means there have been decreases
in the level of workers’ welfare.
As is the case for most developing countries, only a small proportion of the workforce
in Indonesia is covered by the minimum wage legislation, since the minimum wage rates
apply only to employees.  A significant proportion of workers, the non-employees, are not
covered by minimum wages.
THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON EMPLOYMENT
4.1. Introduction
Research concerning the effect of minimum wages on employment in Indonesia has
recently been undertaken by Suryahadi, et al. (2001).  This study was reviewed briefly in
Chapter 2.  It is a major piece of work.  In recognition that one of the major issues that arises
Table 9
Employed Persons 15 Years of Age and Over by Main Employment Status
1997, 1998 and 1999
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik /BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia)
Main Employment Status 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
1. Employee  30,277,787  28,805,421 29,383,548 29,670,366
2. Self-Employed  37,847,519 40,213,397 40,622,280 39,973,785
3. Employer with Permanent  1,466,471  1,525,625 2,552,803 2,043,169
      Workers
4. Unpaid Worker  15,813,752  17,128,006 16,258,228 18,136,703
    Total  85,405,529  87,672,449 88,816,859 89,824,023
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when undertaking empirical work for a developing country is that of data quality, Suryahadi
et al. (2001) have devoted considerable time to the preparation of their extensive data base.
Suryahadi has kindly made available his panel data set for analysis in this paper.  This
presents an opportunity to learn from his remarkable and extensive analyses, and advance
research on the effects of minimum wages on employment in Indonesia.
In line with Suryahadi’s data, this study examines data for 26 provinces, covering the
period from 1988 to 1999.  A focus is on the specific groups of workers within the urban
formal sector, such as females, youth workers, and less educated workers, which have been
identified in many previous studies as the groups most vulnerable to changes in minimum
wages.  The plan of this chapter is as follows.  The next section uses graphical analysis to
illustrate the employment effect in the provinces with the largest urban formal employment.
Section 2.3 describes the results of the statistical analysis.  Finally, we end the chapter with
some conclusions.
4.2. The Employment Effect in Some Provinces
To illustrate the relationship between the minimum wage and employment in Indonesia,
we take observations for the provinces of Jawa Barat and Jawa Timur, since these provinces
represent the largest proportions of urban formal workers in Indonesia (22.2% and 16.9% of
all the urban formal workers, respectively).  Figures 4 and 5 below show the ratio of the
nominal regional minimum wage (MW) to the nominal average wage (AW) and the
employment ratio in Jawa Barat and Jawa Timur from 1988 to 1999.    The minimum wage is
the same for all groups, but the average wage is computed for specific groups.  Therefore, the
MW/AW ratio will vary across groups.  Meanwhile, the employment ratio (or share) is
measured by the proportion of the specified group of workers to total workers.
Figure 4
Minimum Wage and Employment in Jawa Barat, 1988 - 1999
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Figure 5
Minimum Wage and Employment in Jawa Timur, 1988 - 1999
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A slight negative relationship between the ratio of MW/AW and the employment ratio
in Jawa Barat is evident in the data presented for females and the youth workers group.
Hence, the employment ratio decreased when MW/AW increased, and vice versa.  However,
the most obvious employment effect of changes in the minimum wage is shown by the low
educated workers group.  When the ratio of MW/AW increased from 5.4% in 1988 to 47.0%
in 1990, the employment ratio decreased from 63.2% to 58.7%.  Furthermore, when the ratio of
MW/AW fell from 76.7% in 1994 to 70.3% in 1995, and from 81.3% in 1996 to 68.9% in 1997,
the employment ratio rose from 58.0% in 1994 to 65.4% in 1995 and from 49.3% in 1996 to
54.6% in 1997.
Similarly, in Jawa Timur, the low educated workers group is characterised by the most
obvious effect of the minimum wage:  increases in the MW/AW ratio have been followed by
decreases in the employment ratio.  For example, when the ratio of MW/AW decreased from
75.7% in 1994 to 71.8% in 1995, the employment ratio increased from 55.7% to 72.6%.  It also
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can be seen from Figure 5 that the increase in the MW/AW ratio from 68.3% in 1998 to 72.1%
in 1999 was followed by a decrease in the ratio of employment from 55.0% to 50.3%.
These graphical presentations indicate some support for the conventional theory of
the employment effects of minimum wages.  At the same time, however, it needs to be
appreciated that the changes in the minimum wages were very pronounced, particularly in
the first half of the data period analysed.  Perhaps far greater employment effects might
therefore have been expected.  It is possible, of course, that the true employment effects of the
changes in minimum wages are much larger than those evident from the graphs.  Other
factors which are not taken into account in the bivariate displays in Figures 4 and 5 may mute
these true effects.  This possibility is explored in the statistical analyses that follow.
4.3. The Statistical Analysis
The imposition of minimum wages can be expected to have a different impact on
different groups of workers.  In recognition of this, Suryahadi, et al. (2001) conducted separate
analyses for various groups of workers, using the log of employment for the various groups
as the dependent variable.  Their analysis concentrated on the urban formal sector, since this
segment is most affected by minimum wage regulations.  The independent variables were the
minimum wage, a variable that recorded the degree of compliance with the minimum wage,
a labour demand shifter and a labour supply shifter.  The labour supply shifter was provided
by the relevant urban population of working age, while the labour demand shifter was the
real regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  As well, reflecting the pooled time-series cross-
section nature of the analysis, dummy variables were entered into the estimating equation for
year (11 variables) and province (25 variables).  The results of the estimations in the study by
Suryahadi, et al. (2001) are presented in Table 10 below.
As can be seen from Table 10, Suryahadi, et al.’s (2001) results appear to be consistent
with the conventional theory.  There is a negative relationship between employment and the
real minimum wage.  The degree of compliance variable is negative and significant for the
groups most sensitive to variations in parameters of a minimum wage regime (i.e., females,
youth, less educated and part-time workers).  Demand-side considerations, as captured by
the log of real regional GDP, however, are generally insignificant.  In comparison, supply
side considerations are of over-whelming importance.
While this set of results appears to be quite strong, there are several issues of concern.
First, the R2 values are very high.  While empirical research may place a premium on high R2,
values of 0.99 for pooled time-series cross-section data are quite extraordinary.  The reason
for the high R2 seems to be the key role played by the labour supply variable.  Closer
examination of this variable shows a coefficient insignificantly different (and usually
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Intercept 0.055 -0.471 2.895 -0.108 1.762 -0.262 0.174 -13.879 2.786 -0.532 2.037
(0.088) (0.831) (2.604) (0.178) (1.173) (0.445) (0.205) (1.384) (0.667) (0.828) (0.852)
Log of real minimum wage -0.112 -0.065 -0.307 -0.066 -0.307 -0.017 -0.196 1.000 -0.140 -0.086 -0.364
(3.031) (1.874) (4.642) (1.801) (3.349) (0.480) (3.787) (2.086) (0.699) (2.248) (2.560)
Log of population group 15 0.997 1.004 0.949 0.975 1.052 0.960 1.038 1.145 0.779 1.007 0.911
years old and over (35.016) (38.260) (18.411) (35.655) (15.304) (37.694) (26.433) (2.114) (3.457) (34.134) (8.299)
Log of real regional GDP 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.018 -0.004 -0.001 0.034 -0.127 0.047 0.010 0.068
(1.275) (1.935) (0.652) (1.597) (0.131) (0.065) (2.190) (1.177) (1.058) (0.828) (1.577)
Degree of compliance -0.371 -0.137 -1.177 -0.165 -1.414 0.059 -0.838 0.009 -0.609 -0.217 -1.958
(2.194) (0.860) (3.879) (0.984) (3.371) (0.360) (3.537) (0.010) (1.687) (1.236) (3.003)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 10
Results of Estimation of Employment Regression in the Study by Suryahadi, et al. (2001)
(Dependent variable: Log of employment)
Regressor Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less White- Blue- Full- Part-
Educated collar collar t ime t ime
Summary Statistics Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less White- Blue- Full- Part-
Educated collar collar t ime t ime
R 2 0.998 0.998 0.994 0.998 0.989 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.998 0.964
F-statistic 2973.0 3198.8 1038.1 2894.3 606.8 2771.7 1741.1 102.4 744.8 2806.4 179.5
Source: adapted from Suryahadi, et al. (2001, p.51), Table 1
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numerically very close) to unity.  This is the case even for the groups most vulnerable to the
minimum wage: in such cases shifts in supply might reasonably be argued to result in
unemployment or a shift to the informal sector rather than changes in employment.
Second, the demand-side variable (log of real regional GDP) is insignificant (at the 5%
level) in 10 of the 11 regression equations.  Third, it is unclear how robust the set of results
report in Table 10 is.
Given the above, this paper explores a number of alternative specifications of the
estimating equation.  In examining these alternatives, the comprehensive survey by Brown,
Gilroy and Kohen (1982) serves as a guide.
The first specification issue that might be examined is the choice of dependent variable.
The main alternative to the level of employment is an employment ratio.  Brown, Gilroy, and
Kohen (1982, p.497), for example, stated that the ratio of employment to population is used
most often as the dependent variable to measure the employment effect of the minimum
wage.  Therefore, the regression model to be estimated specifies the log of the group-specific
employment ratio as the dependent variable.26
According to Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982), there are three main alternative ways
of measuring the minimum wage.  First, the minimum wage may be measured by the ratio of
the nominal minimum wage to average hourly earnings, weighted by coverage.  Second, the
minimum wage may be measured by the ratio of the minimum wage to average hourly
earnings, ignoring coverage. Third, the influence of the minimum wage can be represented
by the real minimum wage.  The two studies of the Indonesian labour market to date have
used the latter two measures.  Thus, Rama (2001) used the second alternative, specifically he
used the ratio of the minimum wage to the average earnings of urban labourers and the ratio
of the minimum wage to the average wage in manufacturing.  In comparison, Suryahadi, et
al. (2001) used the third alternative of the real minimum wage.  To check the robustness of the
results, this study uses both alternatives of the minimum wage variable employed to date in
empirical studies of the Indonesian labour market.  As well, while most studies surveyed by
Brown, et al. (1982) used a minimum wage of the same time dimension as the dependent
variable, some studies have considered a lagged value of the minimum wage.  That is
important where, due to the presence of contracts or other adjustment factors, changes in
minimum wages affect employment outcomes with a lag.  This possibility is examined by
including a one-period lagged value of the minimum wage variable in the estimating
equation.27
26An alternative employment ratio variable would be to use a specific group’s share of total employment.  This has
the advantage of netting out the influence of factors (e.g. financial crisis) that might have the same effect on all
groups of workers.
27 As we have only 12 years of data, more complex lag structures will not be considered.
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An aggregate demand variable, given by the log of real regional GDP, is included in the
estimations to take account of the economic conditions.  This type of variable is typically
included in minimum wage studies, and alternatives will not be explored.
In comparison to the study which is the departure point for the analyses presented
below, since the dependent variable is the ratio of employment to population, the population
variable is omitted from the estimation.  However, as used in the study by Suryahadi, et al.
(2001), we control for the effect of variations in the degree of compliance through a measure
given by the proportion of workers who earn above the minimum wage.  In addition, province
dummies are included in the estimations to represent the fixed effects of provincial specific
characteristics which do not vary across time.  Similarly, year dummy variables are included
to measure specific time effects.  This equation is estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) method for all workers and various groups of workers.  The results of the estimations
are presented in Table 11 below.
As can be seen from Table 11, the R2 values indicate that the model can explain between
69 and 83 percent of the variations in the provincial employment data.  This suggests that the
high values of R2 in the Suryahadi, et al.’s (2001) estimation, as recorded in Table 10, are due
to the influence of the supply-side variable.  Omitting this variable from the estimations in
Table 11 has resulted in relatively lower R2 values.
It is important to note that since the population variable in Table 10 had a coefficient
close to 1, there should be minimal differences between the estimated coefficients in Tables 10
and 11.  For example, the regression results for total workers in Table 11 indicate that the
elasticity of total workers to the minimum wage is –0.112.  This is the same as the coefficient
of the minimum wage variable in Table 10.  This suggests that every 10 percent increase in
real minimum wages will led to a 1.12 percent reduction in the employment of total workers.
In comparison, the female workers’ employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage
is –0.310, which implies that a 10 percent increase in the real minimum wages will decrease
the employment of female workers by 3.10 percent.  The elasticity of youth workers with
respect to the minimum wage is –0.303, while for less educated workers it is –0.192. These
coefficients are statistically significant.  However, while the coefficients of the minimum
wage variables for male, adult and educated workers have a negative sign, they are
insignificant.
The second alternative specification of the estimating equation, as given in Table 12,
uses a specific group’s share of total employment as the dependent variable.  The set of
independent variables used in these estimations is the same as that used in Table 11.  These
estimations have R2 values between 69 and 90 percent.  The coefficients of the minimum wage
variable for the so-called vulnerable groups are negative. Their employment elasticities are –
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Intercept 0.054 -0.417 2.400 -0.472 2.863 -0.544 0.741
(0.101) (0.825) (2.479) (0.888) (2.138) (1.032) (0.982)
Log of real minimum wage -0.112 -0.065 -0.310 -0.067 -0.303 -0.019 -0.192
(3.049) (1.872) (4.679) (1.854) (3.311) (0.531) (3.721)
Log of real regional GDP 0.014 0.020 0.012 0.017 -0.002 -0.001 0.036
(1.273) (1.949) (0.592) (1.553) (0.070) (0.099) (2.276)
Degree of compliance -0.373 -0.134 -1.212 -0.186 -1.381 0.026 -0.810
(2.234) (0.848) (4.019) (1.126) (3.313) (0.160) (3.445)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary Statistics Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
R2 0.790 0.746 0.815 0.694 0.833 0.722 0.827
F-statistic 26.245 20.448 30.715 15.824 34.697 18.175 33.344
Table 11
Results of Estimation of Employment Regression
(Dependent variable: Log of the ratio of employment of specific groups of workers to population)
Regressor Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
108 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Desember 2002
0.231 for female workers, –0.187 for youth workers, and –0.049 for less educated workers.
The coefficients for female and youth workers are significant, but the coefficient for less
educated workers is, surprisingly, insignificant.  Meanwhile, the coefficients of the minimum
wage variable for the other groups are positive.  It should be noted that as these equations are
share equations, positive wage coefficients are expected for the less vulnerable groups.  That
is, for example, if an increase in the minimum wage reduces the employment share of
vulnerable groups from 0.5 to 0.25, it must increase the employment share of other groups
from 0.5 to 0.75.  The anomalous result for the less-educated workers in Table 12 suggests that
the specification of the dependent variable used by Suryahadi, et al. (2001) (see   Table 11)
yields more robust findings.
The third alternative is presented in Table 13.  The dependent and independent variables
are the same as those used in Table 11.  In addition, the log of the real average wage of various
work force segments is included as an explanatory variable. The R2 values indicate that the
model can explain between 69 and 83 percent of the variations in the provincial employment
data.  It seems that including the average wage variable does not change much the result of
the estimations.  There are minimal differences between the estimated coefficients in Table 11
and 13.  The importance result from this table, however, arises from a comparison of the
magnitudes of the coefficients on the minimum wage and average wage variables.  Recall
that many minimum wage studies use the logarithm of the ratio of minimum wages to average
wages as an explanatory variable.  Such a variable suggests that the coefficients on the
minimum wage and average wage variables in the Table 13 specification should be equal in
absolute value but opposite in sign.  It is readily apparent that the coefficients do not conform
to this pattern.  This, together with the general insignificance of the average wage variable
(and one anomalous result) suggests a preference for the real minimum wage variable used
by Suryahadi, et al. (2001).
The fourth alternative uses the same dependent and independent variables as were
used in Table 11.  However, in these estimations, the minimum wage variable is replaced by
its one period lag.  The results of the estimations are presented in Table 14.  The R2 values are
between 69 and 83 percent. There is a negative relationship between employment and the
real minimum wage in all segments.  The real minimum wage coefficients are significant for
the groups most sensitive to variations in parameters of a minimum wage regime (i.e., females,
youth and less educated workers). The log of real regional GDP and the degree of compliance,
however, are generally insignificant.  While these estimations are based on a sample that is
different from that used in Table 11 (due to the need to omit the first observation for each
province when the lagged wage variable is used) and hence are not strictly comparable  with
the Table 11 results, they appear to be considerably weaker than the results in Table 11.  In
other words, changes in the minimum wage would seem to impact on employment levels
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rather quickly rather than with the one-period lag as suggested by the model employed in
Table14.28
The fifth and sixth alternative models weighted all the variables based on the population
for the particular group.  The reason for the use of weighted least squares is that the units of
observation are provinces, and these range considerably in size.  While the estimating
equations include province dummies, it might be more appropriate to afford greater weight
in the estimation to the larger provinces.  Preliminary testing of the data suggested that this
might lead to a strengthening of the empirical relationships uncovered.  Hence, in this
preliminary testing, the sample was separated into the 13 largest and the 13 smallest provinces,
and separate equations estimated for these sub-samples.  The results suggested that the
larger provinces were characterised by a stronger negative relationship between the real
minimum wage and employment.  The results of the estimations are presented in Table 15
and 16.  The R2 values for both alternatives are very high, range from 98 to 99 percent.  As the
dependent variable has been transformed in these estimations, these R2 are not comparable
with those presented earlier.
The dependent variable in Table 15 is the weighted values of the log of the ratio of the
employment levels of various groups of workers to the population.  The table shows that the
coefficients of the minimum wage variable for total, female, adult, youth and less educated
workers are negative and statistically significant. The coefficients of the degree of compliance
variable indicate that higher compliance tends to strengthen the negative impact of minimum
wages on these groups of workers.  All of the coefficients of real regional GDP variable,
however, are insignificant.
Finally, the sixth alternative use the weighted of log of a specific group’s share of total
employment as dependent variable.  As can be seen from Table 16, the coefficients of the
minimum wage variable for female, youth and less educated workers are negative.  Their
employment elasticities with respect to minimum wages are –0.199 for female, –0.284 for
youth, and –0.118 for less educated workers.  Similarly, the coefficients of the degree of
compliance variable for these groups are negative and statistically significant.
Apart from the results for male and youth groups of workers, the diagnostic tests
suggest that the fifth and sixth alternatives are statistically adequate regarding functional
form and normality.  However, the tests indicate the problem of heteroscedasticity in both
28 To test this issue, the minimum wage and its one-period lagged value were both included in an alternative model.
These results showed that the minimum wage variable, compared to its one-period lag, has a stronger negative
relationship with the employment.  The estimations showed that the coefficients of minimum wage variable were
significant for all, male, female, youth and less educated workers. In comparison, the coefficients of its one-
period lagged were only significant for female workers.
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alternatives.  The origins of this problem could be taken into account for further research.  In
this study, heteroscedasticity-consistent ‘t’ statistics are used.
The results of all alternative specifications of the estimating equation have shown that
minimum wages have a negative effect on the groups most sensitive to variations in parameters
of a minimum wage regime (i.e., females, youth and less educated workers).  The coefficients
of minimum wage variable for the female and youth groups of workers are statistically
significant in all alternatives.  Apart from alternative 2, which has a negative, but insignificant,
relationship the low educated workers’ elasticities with respect to minimum wages are
statistically significant.  Similarly, the coefficients of the degree of compliance variable for
these groups are negative and, in general, statistically significant.  The coefficients of this
variable in the estimations for females are statistically significant in all alternatives.  In
alternative 4, the coefficients for youth and low educated workers are negative but insignificant.
4.4. Conclusion
Using data for 26 provinces, covering the period from 1988 to 1999, this study examines
the impact of minimum wages on the specific groups of workers within the urban formal
sector.
Bivariate analyses presented for some provinces that represent the largest shares of
urban formal sector workers indicate some support for the conventional theory of negative
employment effects of minimum wages.
The statistical analysis confirms the results of the graphical analysis.  It is shown that
minimum wages have a negative effect on the groups most sensitive to variations in parameters
of a minimum wage regime (i.e., females, youth and less educated workers).  Moreover, the
analyses show that the specification adopted by Suryahadi, et al. (2001) in their comprehensive
report is among the best of the available models.  The only change that might be recommended
is the use of weighted least squares to take account of the considerable differences in the
population sizes of the provinces.
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 Summary Statistics Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
Intercept -1.636 2.099 -0.931 1.715 -1.550 -0.031
(6.331) (3.068) (4.515) (1.375) (2.643) (0.049)
Log of real minimum wage 0.082 -0.231 0.038 -0.187 0.062 -0.049
(4.663) (4.949) (2.729) (2.197) (1.535) (1.136)
Log of real regional GDP 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.028 0.031
(0.932) (0.061) (0.046) (0.242) (2.348) (2.374)
Degree of compliance 0.364 -0.955 0.264 -1.161 0.447 -0.471
(4.526) (4.482) (4.118) (2.989) (2.447) (2.376)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.857 0.826 0.767 0.697 0.900 0.882
F-statistic 41.713 33.217 22.904 16.061 62.721 51.915
Table 12
Results of Estimation of Employment Regression
(Dependent variable: Log of a specific group’s share of total employment)
Regressor Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
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 Summary Statistics Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
Intercept 0.176 -0.783 2.386 -0.911 3.156 -0.685 1.483
(0.314) (1.446) (2.426) (1.593) (2.352) (1.241) (1.975)
Log of real minimum wage -0.111 -0067 -0.310 -0.070 -0.289 -0.022 -0.185
(3.011) (1.950) (4.667) (1.929) (3.167) (0.610) (3.695)
Log of real average wage -0.012 0.036 0.002 0.043 -0.040 0.016 -0.075
(0.774) (1.832) (0.082) (2.014) (1.867) (0.871) (4.369)
Log of real regional GDP 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.016 -0.003 -0.002 0.035
(1.281) (1.837) (0.594) (1.452) (0.121) (0.154) (2.301)
Degree of compliance -0.358 -0.162 -1.215 -0.230 -1.305 0.010 -0.696
(2.129) (1.030) (3.978) (1.387) (3.128) (0.060) (3.038)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.791 0.749 0.815 0.699 0.835 0.723 0.838
F-statistic 25.566 20.193 29.838 15.703 34.226 17.724 35.149
Table 13
Results of Estimation of Employment Regression
(Dependent variable: Log of the ratio of employment of specific groups of workers to population)
Regressor Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
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 Summary Statistics Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
Intercept -0.687 -0.945 0.611 -0.890 0.894 -0.637 -0.336
(1.654) (2.493) (0.803) (2.167) (0.865) (1.558) (0.583)
Log of real minimum wage* -0.058 -0.027 -0.182 -0.033 -0.208 -0.010 -0.123
(1.949) (0.996) (3.342) (1.134) (2.807) (0.330) (2.995)
Log of real regional GDP 0.011 0.021 -0.001 0.013 0.010 -0.001 0.028
(0.969) (2.026) (0.022) (1.198) (0.378) (0.113) (1.814)
Degree of compliance -0.137 0.001 -0.527 -0.059 -0.635 -0.003 -0.305
(0.984) (0.002) (2.072) (0.432) (1.838) (0.024) (1.584)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.784 0.754 0.804 0.694 0.834 0.734 0.837
F-statistic 23.617 19.966 26.631 14.775 32.685 17.896 33.395
*Lagged by one period.
Table 14
Results of Estimation of Employment Regression
(Dependent variable: Log of the ratio of employment of specific groups of workers to population)
Regressor Total Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
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Intercept 0.119 0.393 0.233 2.763 0.923 0.824
(1.075) (1.852) (5.213) (2.798) (8.315) (6.263)
Log of real minimum wage* 0.013 -0.199 -0.016 -0.284 -0.036 -0.118
(0.667) (6.404) (1.500) (4.348) (1.110) (6.081)
Log of real regional GDP* -0.028 0.042 -0.015 -0.015 -0.056 0.007
(2.049) (2.021) (1.771) (0.750) (2.205) (0.471)
Degree of compliance* -0.125 -0.376 -0.141 -0.991 -0.359 -0.553
(1.513) (2.309) (2.323) (3.514) (2.352) (4.012)
Province dummies* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.990 0.992 0.988 0.989 0.994 0.984
F-statistic 668.117 894.619 556.872 647.061 1113.2 421.152
Functional Form 33.127 3.571 1.568 0.001 4.141 1.233
Normality 63.097 19.409 9.118 113.831 32.780 23.622
Heteroscedasticity 25.717 18.883 44.513 14.355 48.538 47.753
* Variables weighted by relevant population.
Table 16
Results of Estimation of Employment Regression, Weighted Least Squares Estimations*
 (Dependent variable: Log of a specific group’s share of total employment)*
               Regressor Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
           Summary Statistics Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
              Diagnostic Tests Male Female Adult Youth Educated Less
Educated
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CONCLUSION
The theoretical effects of a minimum wage seem to be ambiguous.  The competitive
labour market model suggests that the introduction of a minimum wage that raises the
wages of some workers would automatically reduce the employment prospects of that
particular category of workers.  The monopsony and efficiency wage models, however, suggest
that the link between wages and employment is not automatically negative, and might be
positive. These ambiguous theoretical conclusions are also reflected in the available empirical
evidence.
With respect to the debate on the minimum wage, this study examines the impact of
increases in minimum wages on specific groups of workers within the urban formal sector in
Indonesia.  The results from previous studies of the Indonesian labour market by Rama
(2001) and Suryahadi, et al. (2001) serve as a benchmark.
Bivariate analyses for some provinces that represent the largest shares of urban formal
workers have shown that there is a slight negative relationship between the ratio of minimum
wage to average wage and the employment ratio.  The results of statistical analysis strengthen
the results of the graphical analysis. Using the comprehensive survey by Brown, Gilroy and
Kohen (1982) as a guide, a number of alternative specifications of the estimating equation are
explored.  The results of all alternatives have shown that minimum wages have a negative
effect on employment for the groups most sensitive to variations in parameters of a minimum
wage regime (i.e., females, youth and less educated workers).
As an implication, increases in the minimum wages that are higher than productivity
gains may reduce Indonesia’s export competitiveness and create a barrier to new investments.
Therefore, the government should keep the minimum wages in line with productivity that is
determined at the firm level.  This might be achieved through negotiation between employers
and workers’ union.
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